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ESSAY

AEREO AND COPYRIGHT’S PRIVATE–PUBLIC
PERFORMANCE LINE

G LYNN S. LUNNEY, JR.†
The Copyright Act of 1976 provides to copyright owners the exclusive
right to perform their copyrighted works publicly, but not the exclusive
right to perform their works privately. As a result, to determine whether
any given performance infringes a copyright owner’s exclusive rights, we
must draw a line between public and private performances. While drawing
such a line might appear a simple task, it has proven surprisingly diﬃcult.
The current line between public and private performances is more a historical
accident, coupled with historical path dependence, than a rational attempt to
advance copyright’s purposes.
On January 10, 2014, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in American
Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc.1 By doing so, the Court has seized an opportunity to bring some rationality to copyright’s line between public and
private performances. In this pending case, the respondent, Aereo, uses
thousands of tiny antennae to capture television broadcast signals, which
then transmit the signals to its subscribers over the Internet.2 The question
presented is whether Aereo “publicly performs” the copyrighted works
carried in the television broadcast signals that are captured and retransmitted.3
† McGlinchey Staﬀord Professor of Law, Tulane University Law School. I would like to
thank James Grimmelman for his help facilitating this Essay’s publication, and Tyler Ochoa,
David Post, and Rebecca Tushnet for their helpful comments on the Aereo issues.
1 134 S. Ct. 896 (2014), granting cert. to WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir.
2013).
2 See generally Aereo, 712 F.3d at 680-83 (detailing Aereo’s transmission system from the subscriber’s perspectives, and with regard to its technical aspects).
3 Brief for Petitioners at i, Aereo, 134 S. Ct. 896 (No. 13-461).
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Unfortunately, the answer to this question is not clear from the relevant
statutory language. The petitioners insist that Aereo’s service is the technical
equivalent of cable, and as such, is a public performance.4 Aereo counters
that its service is the technical equivalent of a thousand rooftop antennae on
a thousand private homes, and as such, is a private performance.5 Two
judges on the Second Circuit panel below agreed with Aereo and held that
Aereo had not publicly performed the copyrighted television programs at
issue.6 The third, agreeing with the petitioners’ characterization, dissented.7
Ultimately, however, both sides misused their analogies. Aereo is not
the technical equivalent of either a cable provider or a thousand rooftop
antennae. Rather, Aereo is the technical equivalent of both. Regardless of
whether the focus is on cable providers, rooftop antennae installers, or
Aereo, each service acts as an intermediary enabling individual consumers to
receive broadcast signals and watch copyrighted television programs in the
privacy of their own homes. Treating Aereo as analogous to only a cable
provider, or only rooftop antennae, will not work.
Instead of employing superﬁcial analogies or the siren call of technical
neutrality, I suggest that we look at the underlying economics. When
Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress expressly required
cable providers to obtain public-performance licenses for the private
performances they enable.8 However, Congress refused to require such
licenses for rooftop antennae installers.9 Though historical path dependence
undoubtedly played a role, a rational basis exists for this distinction.
Speciﬁcally, cable providers enjoy a substantial degree of market power,
arising from the naturally monopolistic character of their service. In
contrast, rooftop antennae installers do not.
This distinction creates three important diﬀerences in the economic
consequences that follow when the public-performance right covers an
intermediary’s activities. First and most speciﬁcally, an intermediary’s
market power determines the extent to which a licensing fee, if one is
required, would be paid by the intermediary itself—rather than passed
along to consumers in the form of higher prices. Thus, the congressional
4 See id. at 26-31 (“Aereo . . . is no more a mere equipment provider than a cable or satellite
company; it is clearly performing the content it uses to market its service.”).
5 See Brief for Respondent at 16, Aereo, 134 S. Ct. 896 (No. 13-461) (emphasizing that Aereo’s
technology relies on individual antennae assigned to each user).
6 See Aereo, ��� F.�d at ��� (aﬃrming the judgment for Aereo below).
7 See id. at 696-97 (Chin, J., dissenting) (labeling Aereo’s retransmission system a “sham”).
8 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § ���(c)(�), �� Stat. ����, ���� (codiﬁed at ��
U.S.C. § 111(c)(1) (2012)).
9 Id. § 110(5) (2012).
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distinction identiﬁes those cases where a licensing requirement would not
double-charge consumers for watching television. Second, the intermediary’s
market power also determines the extent to which the intermediary earns
rents—or proﬁts in excess of normal returns on the costs of providing its
services. Therefore, the market-power distinction identiﬁes instances where
rents accrue, and where a license requirement would force the intermediary
to share a portion of those rents with the copyright owners whose works
helped generate them. Third and ﬁnally, the market-power distinction
determines the extent to which a licensing fee, if required, would represent
an additional source of revenue for copyright owners, rather than simply
cannibalize existing advertising-based revenue streams. It thus identiﬁes
those instances where a licensing fee will most substantially increase
revenue to copyright owners.
The market-power distinction thus provides a rational basis for distinguishing between cable providers and rooftop antennae installers. Though
both serve as intermediaries that enable otherwise identical private performances,
one enjoys market power, while the other does not. That diﬀerence, on its
own, fully justiﬁes Congress’s decision to treat cable and antennae installers
diﬀerently under the Copyright Act’s public-performance right.
When we extend this analysis to Aereo, the key question becomes
whether Aereo is more likely (i) to have market power arising from the
naturally monopolistic character of its service, like cable, or (ii) to face a
competitive marketplace, like antennae installers. Though Aereo’s service
may be the technical equivalent of both cable and antennae installers, it is
the economic equivalent of only one. Whatever temporary lead-time
advantage Aereo may presently have, there is nothing unique about the
service it provides. Given the technology that Aereo employs, anyone can
set up a similar service. Once the legality of its business practice becomes
clear, we should fully expect other parties to do so. As a result, Aereo is far
more likely to face the same sort of competitive marketplace that antennae
installers face than to enjoy cable’s natural-monopoly position. Aereo’s
activities should not, therefore, constitute a public performance.
The following explores these issues in more detail. Part I explores the
historical background and the Second Circuit’s analysis of the Aereo case.
Part II then develops the argument for distinguishing public and private
performances by focusing on whether the intermediary at issue is likely to
have market power. Part III concludes.
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I. H OW C ABLE T ELEVISION C AME TO BE A PUBLIC PERFORMANCE,
AND W HAT T HAT M EANS FOR A EREO
Aereo is not the ﬁrst case to come before the Court regarding the proper
scope of the public-performance right. In the years leading up to the
Copyright Act of 1976’s enactment, the Court faced a similar publicperformance question. In Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc.10
and Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,11 the Supreme
Court confronted the question of whether, under the Copyright Act of
1909, community antenna television (“CATV”) systems, which captured
public television broadcasts with a few large antennae and retransmitted
them to their subscribers, were publicly performing the copyrighted television
programs contained in the broadcasts.12 The Court held that the CATV
systems were not.13 In the Court’s view, a broadcaster performs a copyrighted
television program when it selects the program for broadcast, converts it
into electronic signals, and then transmits those signals as radio waves for
public reception.14 In contrast, members of the public who use antenna and
television sets to convert those electronic signals back into the visual images
and audible sounds do not perform a copyrighted television program.15
Between these two roles, the Court concluded that CATV “falls on the
viewer’s side of the line”16 and thus did not perform the copyrighted
television programs it broadcasted.17
However, Congress expressly rejected this outcome when it enacted the
Copyright Act of 1976.18 In the 1976 Act, Congress added a “transmit”
10
11
12
13

392 U.S. 390 (1968).
415 U.S. 394 (1974).
See id. at 396-97; Fortnightly Corp., 392 U.S. at 391-93.
Teleprompter Corp., 415 U.S. at 412-15 (“CATV systems thus do not interfere in any
traditional sense with the copyright holders’ means of extracting recompense for their creativity or
labor.”); Fortnightly Corp., 392 U.S. at 399-402 (“[A] CATV system no more than enhances the
viewer’s capacity to receive the broadcaster’s signals.”).
14 Fortnightly Corp., 392 U.S. at 397-98.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 399.
17 The Court explained that “a CATV system [merely] provides a well-located antenna with
an eﬃcient connection to the viewer's television set.” Id. Similarly, “[i]f an individual erected an
antenna on a hill, strung a cable to his house, and installed the necessary amplifying equipment, he
would not be ‘performing’ the programs he received on his television set.” Id. at 400. Thus, the
Court concluded that “the only diﬀerence in the case of CATV is that the antenna system is
erected and owned not by its users but by an entrepreneur.” Id.
18 See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 709 (1984) (holding that the 1976 Act
required cable operators to pay royalties for retransmitting copyrighted material); Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 469 n.17 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(remarking that the Court’s previously “narrow interpretation of ‘perform’” had been “completely
overturned” by the 1976 Act).
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clause to the deﬁnition of performing a work “publicly” speciﬁcally to reach
the CATV systems’ retransmissions.19 In particular, section 101 of the Act
provides: “To perform a work ‘publicly’ means . . . to transmit . . . a performance . . . to the public.”20 Section 101 further provides: “To ‘transmit’ a
performance . . . is to communicate it by any device or process whereby
images or sounds are received beyond the place from which they are sent.”21
With these deﬁnitions, Congress made it a public performance to transmit
or retransmit broadcast signals that contain copyrighted works. Because
CATV systems, and cable providers generally, transmit such signals to the
public, their transmissions fall within the scope of the copyright owner’s
public-performance right. While watching a television program in the
privacy of one’s own home remains a private performance, capturing and
transmitting broadcast signals to the public is a public performance of the
copyrighted television broadcasts carried in the signals. Under the 1976 Act,
a cable provider must therefore obtain a public-performance license.
However, to ensure that the need to obtain such licenses did not discourage
investment in cable systems, Congress provided a statutory license in the 1976
Act to cover cable providers’ retransmissions.22
In Aereo, the petitioners argue that the transmit clause functionally covers
Aereo’s activities.23 Just like cable, Aereo uses antennae to capture broadcast
signals that contain performances of copyrighted television programs.
Furthermore, just like cable, Aereo then retransmits those signals, and the
embedded performances, to its subscribers. While the individual subscribers
receive the performances in diﬀerent places—each in their own homes—
that, too, is just like cable. Given that Congress defined “publicly”
performing a work speciﬁcally to ensure that cable retransmission is a
public performance, the petitioners argue that Aereo’s activities must also
be public performances.
Aereo, on the other hand, insists that the transmit clause does not reach
its activities. Its service, Aereo argues, is not the equivalent of cable, but
19 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § ���, �� Stat. ����, ���� (codiﬁed at �� U.S.C.
§ 101 (2012)); see also H.R. R EP. N O. 94-1476, at 63 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5677 (“[A] cable television system is performing when it retransmits the broadcast to its subscribers.”).
20 17 U.S.C. § 101.
21 Id.
22 17 U.S.C. §111(d). Rather than negotiate with copyright owners individually, cable providers
need only pay a compulsory licensing fee set by the Copyright Oﬃce. See WNET, Thirteen v.
Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 685-86 n.8 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Broad. Cos. v.
Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 896 (2014).
23 Aereo, 712 F.3d at 693 (“Plaintiﬀs argue that holding that Aereo's transmissions are not
public performances exalts form over substance, because the Aereo system is functionally
equivalent to a cable television provider.”).
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rather the equivalent of installing rooftop antennae.24 While Congress
deﬁned public performance to reach cable retransmission, it refused to give
copyright owners an exclusive right to perform their works privately.25 Just
as under the 1909 Act, watching a television program in one’s own home
remained a private performance, and as such, falls outside the scope of the
copyright owner’s exclusive right. Because such performances are private, a
company that sells and installs rooftop antennae to enable consumers to
watch a television broadcast in the privacy of their own homes also remains
outside the scope of the copyright owner’s exclusive right. Such activity
remains outside the copyright owner’s exclusive right even if a company
installs rooftop antennae on thousands of homes.26 In Aereo’s view, that is
all Aereo is doing. Unlike traditional cable or CATV systems, Aereo does
not use just a few large antennae to capture a broadcast signal, and then
retransmit that one captured signal to all of its subscribers. Rather, it uses
thousands of tiny antennae, each one speciﬁcally assigned to an individual
subscriber. In Aereo’s view, if installing rooftop antennae does not infringe
the public-performance right, then neither should its service.
Two of the three judges on the Second Circuit panel agreed with
Aereo’s characterization, while the third agreed with the petitioners’.27
Curiously, both the majority and the dissent insisted that the statute’s plain
language is unambiguous and dictates their result.28 The statute’s language
is not, however, unambiguous. A careful parsing of the statutory language
reveals at least three potential ambiguities. The ﬁrst arises from the phrase

24 See generally id. (adopting Aereo’s argument and noting that “[i]t is beyond dispute that
the transmission of a broadcast TV program received by an individual's rooftop antenna to the TV
in his living room is private”). The Second Circuit further found “no reason why the result [in
favor of ﬁnding a private performance] should be any diﬀerent when [a] rooftop antenna is rented
from Aereo and its signals transmitted over the Internet: it remains the case that only one person
can receive that antenna's transmissions.” Id.
25 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, §§ 107-12, 90 Stat. 2541, 2546-�� (codiﬁed as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–13 (2012)) (listing various “[l]imitations on exclusive rights”).
26 As Justice Stewart explained, writing for the Court in Fortnightly Corp., “mere quantitative
contribution cannot be the proper test to determine copyright liability in the context of television
broadcasting,” since under such a scheme, “many people who make large contributions to
television viewing might ﬁnd themselves liable for copyright infringement—not only the
apartment house owner who erects a common antenna for his tenants, but the shopkeeper who
sells or rents television sets, and, indeed, every television set manufacturer.” Fortnightly Corp. v.
United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 397 (1968).
27 See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
28 Compare Aereo, 712 F.3d at 695 (“[The statutory] language and its legislative history . . .
compels the conclusion that Aereo’s transmissions are not public performances.”), with id. at 698
(Chin, J., dissenting) (“It is apparent that Aereo’s system ﬁts squarely within the plain meaning of
the statute.”).
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“to transmit”29 and the question of volition. In the Aereo set-up, an antenna
picks up the signal, and a wire or cable carries the signal to the individual
subscriber’s home. If this constitutes a transmission, who transmits the
performance at issue: Aereo by creating the system, or its subscriber by
selecting a program for viewing? The second ambiguity arises from the
phrase “a performance”30 and its interaction with Aereo’s multiple, individually
assigned antennae. Is each antenna capturing and transmitting the same
performance or is each antenna capturing and transmitting a separate
performance? The third ambiguity arises from applying the phrase “to the
public”31 to Aereo’s multiple, individually assigned antennae. Since each
antenna is individually assigned, each antenna transmits the signal to only
one subscriber. Is such a transmission “to the public”?
We could of course resolve each of these ambiguities, as both the
majority and the dissent in the Second Circuit implicitly did, by pretending
that Aereo’s service is either (i) the technical equivalent of a cable system,32
or (ii) the technical equivalent of a thousand rooftop antennae on a thousand
private homes.33 If Aereo’s service were the technical equivalent of just one
of these, then one could simply adopt the corresponding legal treatment and
resolve the ambiguities accordingly. The problem is that Aereo’s service, as
a technical matter, is the equivalent of both cable providers and rooftop
antennae installers.
II. F INDING A SENSIBLE PATH FORWARD
Rather than pretend that a search for the right technical equivalent can
provide meaningful guidance, we ought instead to look for economic
equivalence. Speciﬁcally, we should determine whether, given its market
position, imposing on Aereo the duty to obtain public-performance licenses
for its activities would have economic consequences more similar to (i)
those that follow from requiring cable systems to obtain such licenses, or
(ii) those that would follow if we were to require companies that sold and
installed rooftop antennae to obtain such licenses.
The underlying economics indicate that the key diﬀerence between cable
providers and rooftop antennae installers is the fact that cable providers are
29
30
31
32

17 U.S.C. § 101.
Id.
Id.
Aereo, 712 F.3d at 697 (Chin, J., dissenting) (“Aereo is doing precisely what cable companies,
satellite television companies, and authorized Internet streaming companies do.”).
33 See generally id. at 690 (noting that “[n]o other Aereo user can ever receive a transmission
from that copy”).
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likely to have market power, while rooftop antennae installers are not. The
economic consequences of extending public-performance rights to these
intermediaries depends, in three important ways, on whether they enjoy
market power. First, market-power presence determines whether publicperformance licensing fees will come out of the intermediary’s pocket, or,
alternatively, be passed along to consumers. In the absence of market
power, any licensing fee imposed on the intermediary will simply be passed
along to consumers in the form of higher prices for the intermediary’s
service.34 Consumers already pay for private performances of the television
programs by making themselves available to watch associated commercials.35
Charging consumers twice, once in the form of advertisements and a second
time in the form of a passed-along licensing fee, is neither fair nor eﬃcient.
It is unfair because it forces some consumers to pay twice for broadcast
television, while others pay only once—based purely on the fortuitous
happenstance of whether a consumer’s residence is well located to capture
television broadcasts using an antenna. It is ineﬃcient because, by raising
prices, it creates deadweight loss.36
Second, the presence of market power determines whether the intermediary
will earn rents from the performances of the copyrighted television programs
at issue. Where market power and its associated rents are present, extending
the public-performance right to cover the intermediary’s activities enables
copyright owners to capture (or recapture) from the intermediary a share of
the rents their works make possible.
Third, market-power presence determines the extent to which a publicperformance licensing fee oﬀers copyright owners a new revenue source. As
discussed, in the absence of market power, a licensing fee will be passed
along to consumers. The licensing fee thereby reduces the money consumers
have available to spend on the products and services advertised on the
television programs they watch. Rather than creating an additional source
of revenue for copyright owners, imposing a licensing requirement on
intermediaries that lack market power will tend to cannibalize the revenue
34 This trend is well known in economics. See, e.g., HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE
MICROECONOMICS: A M ODERN A PPROACH 294-96 (5th ed. 1999) (explaining the extent to
which a tax on producers will be passed along to consumers, and showing that the eﬀect on
consumers depends on supply elasticity (market-power presence)).
35 Whether consumers directly infringe copyrighted television programs by recording them
and then skipping the commercials when they play back the programs is a separate question. See
generally Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 723 F.3d 1067, 1075 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that
“commercial-skipping does not implicate Fox’s copyright interest because Fox owns the copyrights
to the television programs, not to the ads aired in the commercial breaks”).
36 See generally V ARIAN , supra note 34, at 296-98 (explaining “the lost value to the consumers
and producers due to the reduction in sales of the good”).
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copyright owners would otherwise earn from advertising associated with
their copyrighted television programs.
As a result, if Congress were to extend the public-performance right to
reach intermediaries that operate in a competitive market (like rooftop
antennae installers), the resulting licensing fee would simply be passed
along to consumers in the form of higher prices. It would force consumers
to pay twice for watching the copyrighted works at issue. Consumers would
pay both the customary charge for broadcast television programs by watching
(or making themselves available to watch) associated commercials, as well as
a surcharge in the form of a licensing fee tacked on to the price of a rooftop
antennae. Moreover, no part of the licensing fee would be paid out of the
pocket of the intermediary—the rooftop antennae installers—nor would
imposing such a fee enable copyright owners to recapture some of the rents
that the installers were earning from enabling the performances at issue. In
a competitive market, antennae installers would not earn any rents from
their services, or from the performances of the copyrighted works that their
services make possible.37 Rather, they would earn only normal, competitive
returns on the costs of installing antennae. For the same reason, extending
the public-performance right to intermediaries facing a competitive
marketplace also would not oﬀer copyright owners a new revenue source.
Whatever additional money they could collect from a public-performance
license would, in a competitive market, come directly from consumers. The
public-performance license would thereby reduce the revenue copyright
owners earn from their existing, advertising-based revenue stream.
In contrast, if Congress extends the public-performance right to reach
intermediaries with market power, such as cable providers,38 the consequences

37 However, even in a perfectly competitive market, non-marginal participants may earn
some rents. These rents do not arise from the copyrighted works, but rather from, for example, an
antennae installer’s exceptional skill and talent. There is no reason to extend the publicperformance right to enable copyright owners to claim a share of the rents exceptional individuals
earn from their own talents.
38 During the 1970s, pervasive price regulation limited the cable companies’ ability to exploit
their market power. When the industry was deregulated following the Cable Franchise and
Communications Policy Act of 1984, the full extent of cable’s monopoly power became apparent.
As then-Senator Al Gore stated: “Precipitous rate hikes of 100 percent or more in one year have
not been unusual since cable was given total freedom to charge whatever the market will bear.” 135
C ONG. R EC. S5692 (daily ed. May 18, 1989); see also Kathleen A. Carroll & Douglas J. Lamdin,
Measuring Market Response to Regulation of the Cable TV Industry, 5 J. R EG. E CON. 385, 385 (1993)
(ﬁnding evidence in changes in prices that cable possessed “elements of natural monopoly”). Cf.
John W. Mayo & Yasuji Otsuka, Demand, Pricing, and Regulation: Evidence from the Cable TV
Industry, 22 RAND J. ECON. 396 (1991) (”[W]hile regulation did not lead to economically eﬀicient . . .
prices for basic cable service, it did act to keep prices below monopoly levels.”).
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would be quite diﬀerent. Cable providers are likely earning rents from their
transmissions of copyrighted works. Given their market power, part of the
public-performance licensing fee—and in some cases, the entire fee—would
come out of those rents.39 It would not be passed—at least not in its entirety—
to consumers. Consequently, imposing such a fee on cable providers does
not raise the same concern about double-charging consumers as imposing a
fee on antennae installers. Moreover, because an intermediary with market
power earns rents from the performances of copyrighted works, imposing
such a fee would also enable copyright owners to share in the rents that the
intermediary earns from the performances of copyrighted works. Therefore,
the fee both prevents the intermediary from unjustly enriching itself on

Some may argue that cable either does not presently or will not in the future have signiﬁcant
market power. Compare, e.g., S USAN C RAWFORD, C APTIVE A UDIENCE: T HE T ELECOM
INDUSTRY AND M ONOPOLY P OWER IN THE N EW G ILDED A GE 2, 64, 113, 172 (2013) (arguing
that cable will have a monopoly over high-speed Internet access), with Christopher S. Yoo,
Technological Determinism and Its Discontents, 127 H ARV. L. R EV. 914, 918-28 (2014) (reviewing
C RAWFORD, supra) (arguing that digital subscriber line (DSL) services or wireless broadband
services may limit cable’s market power over Internet access). However, at the time that Congress
enacted the Copyright Act of ����, it is fair to characterize cable as having had signiﬁcant market
power over its subscribers.
39 This, too, is a well known result in economics. See generally V ARIAN , supra note 34, at 40105 (explaining the concept of economic rent). The licensing-fee portion that comes from the
intermediary’s pocket and the portion that comes from the consumers’ both depend on the
elasticity of supply and demand in the market, as well as the nature of the licensing fee (e.g.,
lump-sum, percentage of revenue, or per-play).
For an example of a case where no part of the licensing fee would be passed to consumers,
consider radio stations. Because of limitations on the permissible broadcasting spectrum and the
need for a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) license, radio stations often enjoy a
degree of market power arising from natural-monopoly characteristics. They are therefore likely to
make some degree of monopoly proﬁts from their performance of musical works. By recognizing
those performances as public, the current scheme enables the copyright owners in musical works to
negotiate for a share of those proﬁts.
Moreover, no part of the radio station’s licensing fee is likely to be passed to consumers.
Whether or not a radio station must pay a public-performance royalty, the airtime that the radio
station devotes to advertisements will remain unchanged. Increasing advertising airtime increases
the airtime that the station can sell, but it will eventually begin to reduce the price the station can
charge for advertisements—both by increasing the supply of airtime available, and by leading the
station’s audience to switch to other stations. A radio station determines the fraction of airtime
devoted to advertisements by balancing these two marginal eﬀects to maximize its revenue. The
existence or absence of a licensing fee will not change the station’s analysis. Thus, any licensing fee
that the radio station pays will not be passed to consumers.
However, this trait does not mean that a license requirement and its corresponding fee come
without cost. Requiring a public-performance license from radio stations reduces the stations’
proﬁtability. This reduction will not have much impact in larger markets, where a radio station
will remain suﬃciently proﬁtable such that the radio dial will still be full. However, the reduction
is likely to reduce the number of radio stations in less populous and rural markets, where radio
stations are more likely to operate at the margins of proﬁtability.
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another’s works, while oﬀering copyright owners an additional source of
revenue. While a cable provider’s rents come out of consumers’ pockets and
thus have a similar tendency to cannibalize advertising revenue, a licensing
fee allows copyright owners to capture some of the revenue that would
otherwise go from consumers to the cable provider in any event.
Overall, market power provides a sensible reason for Congress’s decision
to distinguish between cable providers and antennae installers on the
public-performance issue. The fact that cable providers generally have
market power, while antennae installers do not, provides a sensible basis for
requiring a license (and an associated fee) from one intermediary, but not
the other.
Here, the underlying economics of Aereo’s service indicate that its
market situation is more similar to that of an antennae installer than a cable
provider. However, the key diﬀerence between Aereo and traditional cable
is not the use of many, rather than just a few, antennae to collect the signal.
Rather, the key diﬀerence between Aereo and a cable provider is the fact
that a traditional cable provider transmits the broadcast over its own cable
network to its subscribers’ homes, while Aereo transmits a signal over the
Internet from an antenna to an individual home.
The suggestion that this diﬀerence in transmission method is key may
seem strange at first blush: Why should it matter whether the retransmission
occurs over a company’s own cable network or the Internet? Yet, after
rationalizing the public-performance right, this distinction emerges as the
material diﬀerence between cable and Aereo. The diﬀerence in transmission
method determines the extent to which, because of natural-monopoly
considerations, a company will have market power over the transmission.
The natural-monopoly character of cable arises not merely from its high
ﬁxed and low marginal costs, but also from government sanction. For a
company to transmit a signal over its own wires, it has historically been
necessary to lay cable, whether copper wire or ﬁber optic, to each and every
individual home and business. Negotiating for permission to lay cable
across private property can prove expensive and often impractical. To
overcome these diﬃculties, cable companies usually rely on the delegated
power of eminent domain to obtain the necessary easements. Counties and
municipalities typically delegate their power of eminent domain to only one
cable provider. As a result, in most markets, there is only one cable service.40
40 This is certainly true where the author lives. On this issue more generally, see M ARK
C OOPER, C ABLE M ERGERS AND M ONOPOLIES: M ARKET P OWER IN D IGITAL M EDIA AND
C OMMUNICATIONS N ETWORKS 19-38 (2002) (discussing the long tradition of cable monopolies,
“born with franchise monopoly service territories in the 1970s”).
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While other options, such as satellite, exist, these alternatives diﬀer from
cable in important ways (e.g., cable companies lay and transmit over their
own lines, while satellite companies do not), such that cable retains
considerable market power.
Aereo, by contrast, may have some initial market power because of its
entrepreneurial skill and risk-taking, but it does not have any natural
monopoly power. So long as Internet service providers may not discriminate
between the bits they carry,41 anyone can set up a similar service and
compete with Aereo. If Aereo continues to earn rents from its service,
competitors will likely enter the market once legal rules become clear.
Aereo’s market situation is thus more similar to that of rooftop-antennae
companies than it is to the cable service providers’. Just as with antennae
installers, extending the public-performance right to Aereo’s activities
would not enable copyright owners to recapture a share of the rents Aereo
earns from the performances Aereo makes possible. Facing a pending
competitive market, Aereo, just like antennae installers, will not earn (or at
least will not earn for long) any rents from its performances—only a
reasonable return on the cost of its service. Similarly, instead of requiring a
licensing fee paid solely from Aereo’s pockets, extending the publicperformance right to Aereo would lead to Aereo’s customers being charged
twice: first through advertisements associated with the copyrighted programs,
and second through the passed-along licensing fee. This fee would also
reduce, on a dollar-for-dollar basis,42 the money consumers have available to
spend on advertised products. Instead of oﬀering copyright owners a new
and additional revenue stream, a licensing fee would instead tend to cannibalize
copyright owners’ existing advertising revenue stream.
This approach thus suggests that the Second Circuit resolved Aereo
correctly. Given the underlying economics, Aereo’s activities are analogous
41 Nondiscrimination’s eﬀect on the market is one of the reasons that the net-neutrality
debate is so important. See generally Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (striking
the FCC’s net-neutrality rules, but not the FCC’s power to reimpose them on a case-by-case basis
under section 706 of the 1996 Telecommunications Act).
42 This phrase distinguishes between the diﬀering eﬀects of a licensing fee in competitive
versus naturally monopolistic markets. In a competitive market, the fee is simply passed to
consumers. Thus, every dollar amount of the licensing fee comes directly from consumers thereby
reducing (by the same dollar amount) the amount that consumers have available to spend on
advertised products.
In contrast, in the monopolistic market, the intermediary absorbs part of the fee. While part
of the licensing fee may be passed to consumers, each dollar in licensing-fee revenue will come
partly from the intermediary’s rents and partly from consumers. As a result, in the monopolistic
market, one dollar paid through a licensing fee will reduce the amount that consumers have
available to spend by less than one dollar.
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to a thousand rooftop antennae installed on a thousand private homes, not
to a cable service provider. The Court should therefore interpret the publicperformance right’s ambiguous language so that the right does not reach
Aereo’s activities.43
III. A R ATIONAL PUBLIC-PERFORMANCE R IGHT
In this essay, I suggest that we should deﬁne the public-performance
right to reach those intermediaries likely to possess market power due to the
natural-monopoly character of their service. This approach not only suggests
the proper resolution in Aereo, but it also explains and justiﬁes some
otherwise puzzling distinctions in the Copyright Act.44 While this approach
43 This approach also suggests that if a cable provider were to use a thousand tiny antennae
and then to assign one to each individual homeowner, subsequent cable transmissions would
remain public performances so long as the signals are transmitted over the cable provider’s own
wires. Some may argue that treating Aereo’s thousand tiny, individually assigned antennae
diﬀerently from a cable provider’s thousand tiny, individually assigned antennae stretches the
statutory language further than it can bear. To the extent that the same result would apply in both
cases, the appropriate solution is to exclude Aereo from the scope of the public-performance right
today and worry about the cable provider possibility if and when it arises. First of all, such an
approach obtains the correct answer in the case presently before the Court, instead of choosing an
incorrect answer for fear of how cable providers may respond in the future. Second, even if cable
providers legally could switch to Aereo’s model in order to avoid the licensing fees, they may not
choose to do so. Third, if cable providers do begin to switch to thousands of tiny, individually
assigned antennae, at some point, their actions may then spur congressional action. Even so, it is
still preferable to deﬁne the public-performance right narrowly in this case and place the burden
on copyright owners to persuade Congress to rewrite relevant statutory language if and when it
becomes necessary. As the addition of the transmit clause in response to the Fortnightly Corp. and
Teleprompter Corp. cases demonstrates, see supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text, copyright
owners have the ability to persuade Congress to revise the scope of their rights when it becomes
necessary and desirable to do so.
44 For example, the public-performance right reaches broadcasters but not companies that
manufacture and sell televisions and radios. Both enable private performances of copyrighted
works, so why should one be liable for a public performance but not the other? In Fortnightly Corp.,
the Court explained that this distinction arose historically by treating broadcasters as exhibitors,
and the viewer as “a member of a theatre audience.” Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists
Television, Inc. 392 U.S. 390, 398 (1968). In other words, “[b]roadcasters perform,” while
“[v]iewers do not perform.” Id.
However, under the deﬁnition of “perform” in the ���� Act, this distinction can no longer
hold. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 101, 90 Stat. 2541, 2543 (codiﬁed at ��
U.S.C. § 101 (2012)) (“To ‘perform’ a work means . . . in the case of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it
audible.”). Under this deﬁnition, both broadcaster and viewer could theoretically “perform” a
work; both broadcaster and viewer could “show” a recorded motion picture in the viewer’s home.
Nevertheless, treating broadcasters’ actions as a public performance, while treating as private the
actions of all the other companies that make it possible for consumers to watch television in their
own homes, remains sensible to the extent broadcasters, but not television manufacturers, have
market power arising from the natural-monopoly character of their markets.
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does not explain the outcomes in all of the cases dealing with the publicperformance issue,45 it provides a rational basis for distinguishing between
intermediaries, all of which oﬀer goods or services that ultimately enable
private performances of copyrighted works.
Where the intermediary at issue likely has market power arising from
the natural-monopoly character of their service, one can plausibly justify
extending the public-performance right to cover that intermediary’s activities.
However, where the intermediary faces a more competitive market, as
Aereo will, one should not extend the public-performance right to the
intermediary’s activities. In such a case, any licensing fee would be passed
to consumers through higher prices for the intermediary’s service. Because
the licensing fee would be passed to consumers, requiring a license would
have three unattractive economic consequences. First, it would force
consumers to pay twice for the same performance. Second, for copyright
owners, a licensing fee would not recapture a share of the rents that the
intermediary was earning from the copyrighted works. Third, the licensing
fee would not provide copyright owners a new and additional source of
revenue.
As long as Congress gives copyright owners an exclusive right to perform
their works publicly, but not an exclusive right to perform their works
privately, courts will have to draw a line between the two kinds of performances.
In cases where an intermediary provides a good or service that enables
members of the public to perform a copyrighted work privately, the intermediary’s likely market power provides a sensible basis for drawing that
line.
A market-power explanation can similarly justify the outcome in the noteworthy case involving
Cablevision, Cartoon Network, LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. See 536 F.3d 121, 139 (2d Cir. 2008)
(holding that providing a remote digital video recorder that subscribers could use to record and
transmit copyrighted television programs does not infringe the public-performance right). Though
the defendant in that case was a cable provider and thus likely had market power, it did not have
market power with respect to the remote storage digital video recorder service at issue. For that
particular service, if Cablevision tried to charge a monopoly price, consumers could simply
substitute a competitively priced set-top digital video recorder.
45 For example, the proposed approach suggests that the Third Circuit resolved the publicperformance issue incorrectly in both Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d
154 (3d Cir. 1984), and Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986).
However, given that the Third Circuit may have incorrectly decided both cases, this application
serves more as a feature than as a ﬂaw of the proposed approach. As I have explained elsewhere,
these cases represent the motion picture industries’ attempt to overturn the ﬁrst sale doctrine with
the public-performance right. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology,
Private Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 V A. L. R EV. 813, 903-04 (2001)
(“[W]hen movie rentals ﬁrst became popular, a group of movie studios set out to obtain a judicial
ruling barring such rentals. Recognizing that the ﬁrst sale doctrine posed a substantial obstacle . . . ,
the studios began by suing a video rental that oﬀered in-store viewing.” (footnote omitted)).
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